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Abstract
This paper documents some key facts about foreign direct invest-
ment flows by U.S. businesses overseas and foreign businesses in the Unit-
ed States. We show how the pattern of flows has evolved, examine the   
sources and destination of these flows, document associated employment 
and productivity gains, and show how investment-related sales compare 
with traditional exports. While the United States is a net debtor to the 
rest of the world, direct investment overseas by U.S. businesses exceeds 
direct investment in the U.S. by foreign businesses. Furthermore, U.S. 
businesses seem to earn more on their foreign investments than foreign 
firms earn on their U.S. investments. The globalization of business invest-
ment is a long-standing phenomenon, but it has accelerated in recent years 
and become a source of concern for some, as it is intimately related to 
the debate on offshore outsourcing. Yet contrary to what some think, the 
bulk of U.S. investment overseas is in other high-income countries. And 
foreign investment in the U.S. has been an important source of employ-
ment growth in recent years.
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t the end of 2006, the United States was a net debtor to the rest of   
 the world, to the tune of $2.540 trillion. U.S.-owned overseas assets of 
$13.755 trillion were offset by foreign-owned assets in the U.S. of $16.295 
trillion. This negative net international investment position reflects more 
than two decades of current account deficits, and the largest single com-
ponent of the current account deficit is the trade deficit.
Just as the U.S. trade deficit is a composite of a deficit in goods trade 
and a surplus in services, so, too, the country’s negative net international 
investment position is a composite of a very large deficit in holdings of 
official assets and a surplus in foreign direct investment. U.S. official re-
serve assets amounted to $219 billion at the end of 2006.1 By contrast, 
foreign official assets in the U.S. totaled $2.770 trillion, primarily reflect-
ing Asia’s extraordinary reserve accumulation in recent years. However, 
in one respect, the U.S. continues to be a net creditor vis-à-vis the rest of 
the world. At the end of 2006, the value of U.S. foreign direct investment 
(FDI) overseas was $2.856 trillion (valued at current cost), while FDI in 
the U.S. was $2.099 trillion.2 
This paper offers an overview of recent trends in global FDI, with a fo-
cus on the United States. In addition, we document empirical evidence on 
the effects of FDI, particularly recent results showing that multinational 
firms generally outperform their domestic peers. Finally, we contribute 
to the literature investigating the employment effects of U.S. investment 
overseas. Our analysis suggests that employment overseas by U.S. multi-
nationals mostly complements domestic employment.
When a U.S.-based firm wants to sell its products in a foreign market, 
it has two options: It can produce in the United States and export to the 
foreign market, or it can set up shop overseas. The choice of which course 
to pursue depends on a myriad of factors, including the existence of bar-
riers to trade (either shipping costs or tariffs or both), the importance of 
physical proximity to customers, taxes, and so on. The traditional, text-
book approach to thinking about how countries interact tends to empha-
size interactions through exporting and importing. Yet increasingly, U.S. 
businesses are setting up operations overseas to produce and sell directly 
into foreign markets. For example, in recent years Ireland has become a 
major platform for U.S. businesses seeking to sell into the single European 
1 This figure differs from the weekly statement on the value of U.S. international 
reserves issued by the Treasury Department due to the latter’s valuation of gold holdings at 
a fixed price of $42.2222 per fine troy ounce rather than the market price, which has been 
closer to $800 an ounce in recent months.
2 The Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) reports the value of foreign direct investment 
three ways. The historical cost method values assets and liabilities at their book value. This 
measure is the easiest to compile but of limited value. The BEA’s featured measure of direct 
investment values assets in current-period prices. Investment in plant and equipment is 
valued using the current cost of capital equipment; investment in land is valued using general 
price indexes; investment in inventories is valued using estimates of the replacement cost of 
inventories. Finally, the BEA reports a measure of direct investment at market value, where 















































market. Likewise, since the 1980s, many Japanese auto companies have 
opened plants in the United States to produce for the American market.
U.S. firms may also invest abroad to take advantage of lower labor 
costs. For example, the big U.S. automobile manufacturers use maquilado-
ras in Mexico to construct parts like doors and electronic components like 
sensors. Upon completion, these goods are shipped to the United States 
for final assembly and eventual sale. 
Cross-border investment is not confined to U.S. companies, of course. 
In fact, worldwide FDI inflows grew from $560 billion in 2003 to $916 bil-
lion in 2005—only two years. Figure 1 displays FDI inflow levels for the 
world, as well as for developed and developing countries. Note that even 
though the flows into developed countries are quantitatively more sig-
nificant than the flows to developing countries, both grew significantly in 
2004 and 2005 following a significant slowdown earlier in the decade.
Figure 1: Global Inward FDI Flows
SOURCE: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, major FDI indicators, World Investment Report 2007, direct
                investment in reporting economy (FDI inward), http://stats.unctad.org/FDI/TableViewer/tableView.aspx?ReportId=899.















Figure 2 displays another dimension along which FDI to developing 
countries is notable. As a share of overall gross fixed capital formation, 
FDI inflows are more significant in the developing world than in rich coun-
tries. More generally, the figure confirms that FDI has grown faster than 
overall domestic capital formation since the early 1990s. 
As with many aspects of globalization, some commentators consider 
the rise of FDI a cause for concern. Some analysts have connected a recent 
slowdown in domestic investment in the United States to U.S. multina-
tionals’ increased investment activity abroad. U.S. businesses are said to 
be shifting investment overseas at an increasing rate, while shying away 
from domestic capital expenditures. 
One way to check the validity of this contention is to look at the ratio 
of U.S. FDI outflows to U.S. private nonresidential investment. Figure 3 
shows how this evolved over 1980–2004. Throughout the 1980s, outgoing 














































Figure 2: FDI Inflows Relative to Gross Fixed Capital Formation
SOURCE: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, major FDI indicators, World Investment Report 2007, direct
                investment in reporting economy (FDI inward), http://stats.unctad.org/FDI/TableViewer/tableView.aspx?ReportId=899.
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Figure 3: U.S. FDI Outflows and Outflows/Investment
SOURCES: Bureau of Economic Analysis, national income and product accounts, Table 5.2.5, and balance of payments and 
                  direct investment position data.



















had increased to around 19 percent by 2004. However, the idea that there 
is only so much investment to go around and hence every dollar that is 
spent abroad is unavailable to be spent in the U.S. is questionable. Are the 
two kinds of investment truly substitutes, or can they be complements? 
Does foreign investment undertaken by U.S. multinationals rob the U.S. 
of real economic activity?
1. Why DO FIRmS INvEST OvERSEAS?
Why do some firms invest directly abroad while others do not? Eco-
nomic theory answers this question by assuming that for a firm to engage 
in FDI, certain conditions must be fulfilled. When faced with either mak-
ing goods at home and exporting them to a foreign market or setting up 














































cal. These costs can arise directly via transportation costs and indirectly 
via tariffs and nontariff barriers. FDI that is motivated by the existence of 
high trade barriers is often referred to as “tariff-jumping.” 
More generally, firms that engage in FDI (multinational firms) are 
usually assumed to have firm-specific assets that both give them an ad-
vantage in their industry significant enough to venture abroad and that 
possess enough public good characteristics  to make the licensing of pro-
duction overseas unattractive (Markusen 2002). Examples of such firm-
specific assets include superior production techniques and management 
strategies. Often it is these assets that are used to explain stylized facts 
about FDI, such as higher productivity and wages in multinational firms 
relative to domestic ones. 
In the past, the FDI literature classified investment undertaken by 
multinational enterprises into one of two categories. The first was hori-
zontal investment, which consists of creating a subsidiary in a host coun-
try that essentially replicates the original firm’s operations. This form of 
investment is chosen when the reason for going abroad is to enter a new 
market. Horizontal investment is usually viewed as the main driver of FDI 
between developed countries, and tariff-jumping is often seen as an impor-
tant motive for horizontal FDI. 
The second category is vertical investment, which seeks to take ad-
vantage of differences in factor costs and shifts a specific stage of produc-
tion abroad. Take, for example, a firm that both designs and assembles a 
product. If the design process is intensive in the use of high-skilled labor 
and the assembly is not, the firm might move final assembly to a country 
where low-skilled labor is abundant and cheap. It is vertical investment 
that lies at the root of many concerns about the potential negative effects 
of globalization and the fear that firms are “exporting jobs.” 
One way to interpret the data that show FDI predominantly occurs 
between developed countries is to conclude that horizontal investment 
plays a much larger role than vertical investment. Presumably, projects in 
Europe and Canada are undertaken to enter new markets, not to access 
large pools of cheap labor. This horizontal investment can be expected to 
increase the domestic activity of the U.S. parent of the new affiliate rather 
than cause it to export jobs. 
In recent years, alternative motivations for FDI have been considered. 
Hanson, Mataloni, and Slaughter (2001) examine data on affiliate imports 
of goods that parent companies send for further processing. This mea-
sure of the extent to which parents provide inputs to affiliate production 
abroad is an indicator of vertically specialized production and outsourc-
ing. The share of processing imports is found to vary significantly by in-
dustry and region, with the highest shares in transportation, electronics, 
and electrical equipment and in Canada and Mexico. The high share in 
those industries is because the corresponding production processes have 
distinct stages that can be separated geographically. The high shares for 
Canada and Mexico point to low trade costs related to the North Ameri-
can Free Trade Agreement. 
In addition, Hanson et al. show why studies may be misleading if they 














































conclude that vertical FDI is unimportant. While overall affiliate sales are 
higher in host countries that are larger and have a higher GDP, the same 
holds for imports for further processing as well. When the ratio of the two 
measures is used as a dependent variable, a familiar result emerges: Work 
is outsourced to smaller countries with lower labor costs. In other words, 
aggregating overall FDI activity in large countries is bound to overlook the 
(not insignificant) part that is vertical. 
As noted above, horizontal FDI is generally considered a substitute 
for exports. Evidence of FDI in wholesale trading leads Hanson et al. to 
question this view. This type of FDI occurs when a firm invests primarily 
in facilities for distribution, rather than production. As an example, Han-
son et al. report that in 1998, only 59.1 percent of total sales by affiliates 
of U.S. parents whose primary industry was electronic and electric equip-
ment were by affiliates primarily in the same industry; 28.1 percent were 
by affiliates primarily in wholesale trade.
Furthermore, firms seem to decide to produce or distribute in a foreign 
country—but rarely do both. So production- versus distribution-oriented 
FDI is a distinction that has been overlooked by the early literature and 
that has important implications for the benefits of FDI for the host coun-
try. The hope for a diffusion of technology and know-how to local indus-
tries that leads many governments to seek FDI is generally based on pro-
duction-oriented investment. The benefits of inbound distribution-oriented 
investment are found in logistical areas such as supply-chain management 
(which can, of course, still provide valuable expertise to developing coun-
tries). 
Using FDI to establish export platforms is another distribution-ori-
ented aspect of horizontal FDI that has received little attention. This 
differs from traditional horizontal investment in that production in the 
host country is not only for sale in that market but reexported to third 
countries. Hanson et al. report that in manufacturing sectors, in the 1990s 
exports accounted for a growing share of affiliate sales and reached 44 
percent by 1998. Not surprisingly, the establishment of export platforms is 
sensitive to the host country’s trade policy and geographic location. 
2. mEASUREmENT OF FOREIGN DIRECT INvESTmENT
For statistical purposes, investment abroad is classified in one of three 
ways, depending on the amount of control achieved over the foreign firm. 
If the share of ownership is below 10 percent, the investment is considered 
portfolio investment. Between 10 and 50 percent, ownership counts as 
foreign direct investment. As soon as the U.S. share in a foreign company 
exceeds 50 percent, the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) treats it as a 
majority-owned foreign affiliate, or MOFA. 
The BEA collects and publishes the most comprehensive data on U.S. 
multinationals and their operations, as well as foreign multinationals’ op-
erations in the United States. The BEA sends out mandatory surveys at 
regular intervals. The agency conducts highly representative and exhaus-














































surveyed. These samples cover only MOFAs, which is the reason for better 
data availability and a corresponding heavier focus on MOFAs in empiri-
cal studies. 
However, the BEA’s data on multinationals are not without prob-
lems, as Lipsey (2007) points out. He shows that data on FDI flows and 
stocks can only provide rough approximations of country distributions of 
“true” FDI sources and destinations and even worse approximations of 
their industry distributions.3 Changes over time in these distributions are 
also not detectable using stock and flow data. The challenge this poses for 
correctly measuring FDI activity has received little attention, since the 
focus has primarily been on the potential tax avoidance by multinational 
companies.
At the root of the problem is “the ability of firms to shift the reported 
location of financial and intangible assets, sales, and profits by paper 
transactions internal to the firm” (Lipsey 2007, 15). One way to see the 
extent of this asset reallocation is to examine the ratio of total assets to 
measures of labor input, such as employment or payroll. In 1999, nonbank 
foreign affiliates of U.S. nonbank parents had average assets of $502,400 
per employee. However, the ratio in Ireland was twice that, affiliates in 
Switzerland had roughly $2 million per employee, the number for U.K. 
islands in the Caribbean was $12.1 million, and the number for Bermuda 
ranged from $16 million to $31.9 million.4 In 2004, the differences were 
even more pronounced. Average assets per employee were $873,000, and 
the ratio for Bermuda was $72.7 million. Lipsey shows that industry com-
position cannot explain these differences. The numbers are similar only for 
affiliates and parents in the financial sector. 
These statistics are a result of the shifting of intangible assets like 
patents, corporate logos, and software licenses. Because such assets lack a 
geographic location, Lipsey (2007, 20) concludes that “only statistical con-
vention places the output from them in these affiliates’ host countries.”5 
The location of intangible assets—and thus, the output attributed to 
them—can be freely chosen by the firm. This has consequences for the 
measurement of exports, imports, and domestic product. For example, 
3  The  true  distributions  are  concerned  with  real  activity,  such  as  production 
and  employment,  as  opposed  to  just  capturing  financial  transactions  and  transfers  of 
intangibles. 
4 The U.K. islands are the British Antilles, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, 
and Montserrat.
5 There is also plenty of anecdotal evidence for tax-motivated transfers within companies. 
The Wall Street Journal reported in 2005 that a Microsoft affiliate in Ireland held most of 
the company’s licenses for copyrighted software. On paper, the 1,000 full-time employees 
working there controlled more than $16 billion in Microsoft assets. The company is one 
of Ireland’s biggest and paid $300 million in taxes to Ireland’s government in 2004. Over 
time, the affiliate has taken over other foreign affiliates of Microsoft, in an obvious effort to 
concentrate the income tied to intangible assets such as licenses and copyrights in Ireland, 
where the tax rate it faces is minimal. Law firms now specialize in helping multinationals set 














































instead of reporting all output for the home market was produced domes-
tically, firms can attribute output produced in the home country for home 
consumption to a foreign subsidiary on paper and then import it back on 
paper. While there is no real change in production and inputs, the treat-
ment of the two alternatives in the statistics would be different.6 
To avoid this distortion, value-added measures concentrate on affili-
ates’ production processes as opposed to the financing thereof. In their 
most recent work on the operations of U.S. multinational companies, Ma-
taloni and Yorgason (2006, 42) argue that “compared to sales, value added 
is a preferable measure of production because it indicates the extent to 
which a firm’s sales result from its own production rather than from pro-
duction that originates elsewhere, whereas sales data do not distinguish 
between these two sources of production.”
3. ThE BASIC FACTS 
When discussing the recent surge in global economic integration, the 
point is often made that the U.S. continues to be a fairly closed economy. 
One of the more traditional measures of openness, the ratio of imports 
and exports to GDP, supports that view. U.S. exports amount to slightly 
less than 12 percent of GDP, up from about 5 percent in the 1950s, while 
imports total nearly 17 percent, up from just over 4 percent in the 1950s. 
However, traditional trade via imports and exports is not the only option 
for companies that want to sell their goods and services on foreign mar-
kets. Globalization is as much the story of the multinational enterprise 
that invests directly in other countries as it is the story of greater trade 
flows due to declining transportation and communication costs. In this 
section, we show that with regard to multinationals, the U.S. has been at 
the forefront of globalization, rather than a laggard. 
Figure 4 presents the facts. The sales growth of majority-owned for-
eign affiliates of U.S. multinationals over 1990–2004 clearly outpaced U.S. 
export growth.7 In addition, 52.4 percent of total U.S. exports in 2004 
were associated with multinationals. So in quantitative terms, multina-
tional companies dominated international transactions. Of the foreign af-
6  At  the  same  time,  productivity  and  growth  statistics  for  countries  like  Ireland 
could be biased upwards. Honohan and Walsh (2002) identify four industries within Irish 
manufacturing that show signs of being “entrepôt” economies. The term (translating literally 
to “warehouse”) refers to an economy in which large amounts of goods are imported and 
then exported again, with little or no processing. The four industries combined employed 3 
percent of the workforce in 1999. However, they accounted for 57 percent of industrial output 
and 15 percent of GDP. So trying to identify the share of output attributable to intangible 
capital and removing it from the calculations gives a more realistic picture of output and 
productivity growth. Honohan and Walsh find that for Ireland, corrected GDP growth drops 
from 8.2 percent to 6.2 percent and labor productivity growth in manufacturing from 8.6 
percent to 3.8 percent. This is another example of transfer pricing and the arbitrary location 
of intangible assets posing problems for traditional ways of accounting and obtaining national 
economic indicators.
7 Note that the numbers depicted are total sales minus the sales that went back to the 
U.S. The share of affiliate sales that go back to the U.S. is significant, especially for Canada 














































Figure 4: U.S. Exports and mOFA Sales, 1983–2004
SOURCES: Bureau of Economic Analysis, national income and product accounts, Table 1.1.5, and “U.S. Direct Investment 
                  Abroad: Financial and Operating Data for U.S. Multinational Companies,” sales by afﬁliates, Table III.F.1.
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filiate sales that did not go back to the U.S., 70.3 percent went directly 
to the host country, while the remaining 29.7 percent were exported to a 
third market.
Closely connected to the purpose of U.S. investment abroad is the 
question of its geographic distribution. It is well documented that direct 
investment primarily takes place between rich countries (e.g., Markusen 
1995 and Lipsey 2001). The U.S. is no exception. In 2004, 79.5 percent of 
the value added by U.S. affiliates abroad was generated in high-income 
countries (Mataloni and Yorgason 2006), down slightly from 82.2 percent 
in 1999.8 The three most important countries in 2004 were the U.K. with 
16.1 percent, Canada with 11.4 percent, and Germany with a 9 percent 
share of the total value added by majority-owned foreign affiliates of U.S. 
multinationals. All three nations saw a decline in their share between 1999 
and 2004; among the countries whose share grew (though from very low 
levels) were China, India, and Poland.
Figure 5 presents the geographic breakdown of U.S. investment out-
flows over 1994–2004. The shares of total investment to specific regions 
were fairly constant over this period; the figure shows the averages of the 
yearly fractions. Because of the aforementioned possibility that the des-
tination of capital flows does not necessarily reflect the location of final 
production, we also examine employment data. Figure 6 shows foreign af-
filiate employment of U.S. multinationals by region. Again, the average of 
the shares for each year is displayed. Comparing the two figures, the most 
notable differences are in the shares for Europe and Asia. This fits well 
with the common perception that U.S. foreign direct investment in Asia 
frequently occurs in labor-intensive sectors to take advantage of low factor 
costs, while projects in Europe are relatively capital-intensive.
8 Value-added is the portion of goods and services sold or added to inventory or fixed 
investment by a firm that results from the firm’s own production. The value-added estimates 
presented here are calculated by summing the cost and profits data collected in the BEA’s 














































Aggregate U.S. capital outflows have been positive for the past twen-
ty-seven years, with the exception of 2005. The widely accepted explana-
tion for the radical change that year is the American Jobs Creation Act 
of 2004 (H.R. 4520). The act cut firms’ tax on repatriated foreign-source 
income to a 5.25 percent rate for one year, as long as they permanently 
reinvested inside the U.S. This made reinvesting abroad temporarily less 
attractive, which resulted in substantial capital flows from affiliates to 
parent companies in 2005. U.S. capital outflows were back to being posi-
tive and significant in 2006 and the first quarter of 2007. Another conse-
quence of the tax holiday was a big drop in reinvested earnings reported 
by affiliates of U.S. multinationals.
Figure 5: Regional Breakdown of U.S. Capital Outflows, 
Average 1994–2004
SOURCE: Bureau of Economic Analysis, “U.S. Direct Investment Abroad: Country and Investment Detail for Capital Outﬂows,” 














Figure 6: Regional Breakdown of Foreign Affiliate Employment, 
Average 1994–2004
SOURCE: Bureau of Economic Analysis, “U.S. Direct Investment Abroad: Financial and Operating Data for U.S. Multinational 




























































Investment in low-cost, low-income countries still makes up only a 
small share of total U.S. capital outflows and an even smaller share of the 
total value added by affiliates of U.S. parents. However, the development 
between 1999 and 2004 may point to a reversal of that trend (recall, also, 
Figure 1). Supporting this view, Hanson, Mataloni, and Slaughter (2001) 
report that the degree of vertical specialization in affiliates of U.S. multi-
nationals increased between 1982 and 1994.9 
4. WAGES AND PRODUCTIvITy IN FIRmS WITh  
INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS
Bernard  and  Jensen  (1995)  were  the  first  to  document  that  U.S. 
manufacturing firms that export pay higher wages than those that do 
not. Their paper was just the beginning of a large literature that reveals 
numerous stylized facts about the behavior and relative performance of 
exporting firms. Other examples of studies on the characteristics of these 
firms are Bernard and Jensen (1999), Clerides, Lach, and Tybout (1998), 
and Aw, Chung, and Roberts (1998). All these studies find that exporters 
across countries are larger, more productive, more capital-intensive, more 
technology-intensive, and pay higher wages. 
While the cross-sectional studies can detect these differences, they 
do not allow any conclusion about causality. Does exporting cause firms 
to perform better along other dimensions? Or is it superior performance 
along other dimensions that allows firms to export? Bernard and Jensen 
(1999) and Clerides et al. find little or no empirical evidence for “learning 
by exporting.” A firm’s productivity and wage structure does not improve 
markedly once it starts to export; in fact, the opposite is more likely. But 
there is strong empirical evidence that high-productivity exporters were 
high-productivity firms years before they started shipping abroad. 
As discussed above, a firm may start exporting or even become a 
multinational and engage in foreign direct investment in order to service 
a foreign market. If multinational firms are endowed with specific assets 
that make it profitable for them to expand abroad, one would expect them 
to differ significantly from local firms in the same industry with regard to 
productivity and wages, just as exporters differ from their nonexporting 
counterparts. Intriguingly, this is indeed the case. 
Feliciano and Lipsey (2006) examine the impact of foreign ownership 
on U.S. wages during 1987–92. In the aggregate, foreign-owned estab-
lishments in the United States paid 29 percent more than domestically 
owned establishments. Much of this gap is explained by differences in 
the distribution of employment across industries. Foreign-owned establish-
ments were concentrated in mining, manufacturing, and wholesale trade 
and tended to be larger than their U.S. counterparts. More than half of 
U.S. employment was in low-wage sectors such as retail trade and services. 
Controlling for industry, state of location, size distribution of plants, and 
other industry- and state-specific factors, the wage difference remains only 
9 More specifically, Hanson et al. interpret the decline in the ratio of value-added over 














































for nonmanufacturing industries, but it is still significant at 8 to 9 percent. 
This study does not take up the question of causality.
Lipsey and Sjöholm (2003) go one step further, using firm-level data 
on Indonesian manufacturing plants. Not only do the authors find evidence 
that foreign-owned firms pay significantly higher wages, the use of a panel 
data set enables them to compare the years before and after an acquisi-
tion, allowing them to address the issue of causation. Lipsey and Sjöholm 
find that both skilled and unskilled workers’ wages increase significantly in 
the two years following an acquisition. They invoke this evidence to argue 
that it is foreign ownership that causes the wage premium. Interestingly, 
this only holds for foreign acquisitions. The effect is absent in the case of 
domestic takeovers. The authors conclude there is no strong support for 
selection by foreign investors since the acquired firms are not significantly 
different prior to the investment.
Two more-recent studies examining the effect of foreign ownership 
on wages are Almeida (2007) and Girma and Görg (2007). Almeida uses 
a matched employee–employer data set from Portugal that allows her to 
trace both foreign participation and workforce characteristics for a spe-
cific firm over time. She finds foreign wage premiums of 32 percent for 
low-education workers and 48 percent for high-education workers, even 
after controlling for age, schooling, tenure, and gender. However, before 
their acquisition, the labor forces of firms acquired by foreigners are sig-
nificantly different from the domestic sector averages. In addition, the 
human capital of the workforce and the average wages of acquired firms 
do not change significantly following the takeover. Thus, Almeida finds 
support for cherry-picking: FDI is not random. Foreigners specifically tar-
get firms already outperforming their peers. Therefore, the empirical fact 
that foreign-owned firms pay higher wages is due to the acquired firms 
having been industry leaders all along, as opposed to having experienced 
improved performance brought about by foreign ownership. Almeida spec-
ulates that the difference between her results and Lipsey and Sjöholm’s 
(2003) is caused by the differing degrees of development of Portugal and 
Indonesia. 
Girma and Görg (2007) examine data on U.K. establishments for 
1980–94. While confirming that foreign-owned firms pay higher wages, 
their study’s goal is to identify the direction of causality. They include 
the nationality of the foreign acquirer in the analysis and find it to be 
significant. In particular, both skilled and unskilled workers experience a 
post-acquisition wage increase if their firm was acquired by a U.S. multi-
national, whereas there is no such effect after an acquisition by European 
Union firms. This finding is very interesting in light of the ongoing debate 
about the apparent excess return that U.S. FDI earns relative to direct 
investment in the United States. 
In contrast to Almeida, Girma and Görg find changes in the structure 














































due to structural differences in Portugal’s and the U.K.’s labor markets. 
Almeida points to several factors unique to the Portuguese case that could 
make labor adjustments less attractive to a foreign investor. These could 
also explain the discrepancy with regard to Feliciano and Lipsey’s results 
for Indonesia. 
Huttunen (2007) investigates the effects of foreign ownership on Finn-
ish establishments over 1988–2001. She also finds a significant positive ef-
fect on wages in all skill groups. The higher a worker’s education level, the 
larger the wage increase. Furthermore, the author finds the positive wage 
effect occurs only within one to three years after the acquisition, similar 
to the findings by Girma and Görg (2007).
5. mANUFACTURING vERSUS SERvICES
The  FDI  literature  exhibits  one  understandable  bias:  A  dominant 
share of the analysis deals with manufacturing firms. Various reasons are 
given for this. Slaughter (1995) reports limitations on services data. In 
addition, manufacturing has the advantage of producing tangible output, 
which can be tracked. The service sector, however, poses numerous prob-
lems, among them the ease with which intangible inputs and outputs can 
be shifted around the globe. 
Nonetheless, recent concerns about globalization and its consequences 
have been caused by reports that outsourcing is shifting from blue- to 
white-collar jobs. An article by Blinder (2007) that has received a lot of 
attention outlines the characteristics of jobs already subject to outsourc-
ing or likely to be so in the future. Well-known examples are call-center 
workers and computer programmers; the country most often cited in con-
nection with outsourcing is India. Blinder concludes that the line between 
jobs that are vulnerable to outsourcing and jobs that are not has changed. 
In the past, whether a job could be outsourced depended on the skill level 
needed. Today, the decisive factor is whether personal interaction and a 
personal relationship are required. This creates uncertainty for employees 
who in earlier phases of globalization felt secure. 
While a careful examination of globalization’s potential adverse effects 
is beyond this paper’s scope, a closer look at the nonmanufacturing side 
of multinational activity seems warranted. Figure 7 shows manufacturing 
employment for U.S. parents of affiliates and the affiliates themselves. 
Figure 8 shows the development of affiliate employment in manufactur-
ing and nonmanufacturing. Figure 9 breaks down the nonmanufacturing 
employment by its components.10
The figures show a remarkable development. We observe the well-
documented  fact  that  manufacturing  employment  by  affiliates  of  U.S. 
multinationals increased over the two decades ending in 2004, in stark 
contrast to manufacturing employment by the parents themselves (Figure 
7). But Figure 8 shows that affiliate employment in sectors other than   
10  The  BEA  reports  a  break  in  the  series  from  1998  to  1999.  The  reason  is  the 
introduction of extended coverage, which led the benchmark survey in 1999 to gather data 














































Figure 7: Outsourcing manufacturing?
SOURCES: Bureau of Economic Analysis, “U.S. Direct Investment Abroad: Financial and Operating Data for U.S. Multinational 
                  Companies,” employment of afﬁliates, selected ﬁnancial and operating data of U.S. parents, Tables III.H.3 and II.M.1.
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Figure 8: Composition of Affiliate Employment
SOURCES: Bureau of Economic Analysis, “U.S. Direct Investment Abroad: Financial and Operating Data for U.S. Multinational 












manufacturing has risen even more dramatically. In 1983, roughly two in 
three employees of affiliates abroad worked in manufacturing. By 2004, 
that number had fallen to one in two. 
Figure  9  shows  the composition  of  nonmanufacturing  affiliate  em-
ployment abroad. Most of the increase in employment stemmed from the 
service sector, followed by retail and wholesale trade. The growth in the 
latter two sectors is consistent with the observation that distribution, not 
production, is an important driver of FDI growth.11
11 Note that the BEA’s industry specifications changed in 1999, which necessitated 
some aggregation assumptions to extend the graph beyond 1998. Mining and utilities were 
aggregated  under  petroleum.  Information  services;  professional,  scientific,  and  technical 
services; administration; support and waste management; and food and accommodation 














































Figure 9: Decomposition of Affiliate Nonmanufacturing Employment
NOTE: The series breaks after 1998; see text for deﬁnition of series.
SOURCE: Bureau of Economic Analysis, “U.S. Direct Investment Abroad: Financial and Operating Data for U.S. Multinational 
                Companies,” employment of afﬁliates, Table III.H.3.
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6. FOREIGN DIRECT INvESTmENT IN ThE U.S.
Foreign direct investment flows go in both directions. As U.S. firms 
have expanded their operations overseas, foreign firms are a growing pres-
ence in the United States. Figures 10 through 12 present the activity of 
foreign multinational enterprises in the U.S. As is well documented, there 
was a significant inflow of FDI into the U.S. during the 1980s and 1990s. 
This can be seen in Figures 10 and 11, which show the gross product of 
U.S. affiliates almost doubled from 1992 to 2000, while employment of U.S. 
affiliates of foreign multinationals rose from 2 million in 1980 to 6.5 million 
in 2000.12 In spite of this growth, the geographic origin of the investment 
flows has remained fairly stable over time. Figure 12 shows the breakdown 
of the gross product by home country of the ultimate beneficial owner, or 
UBO, for 1992–2004.13 The lion’s share of foreign investment in the U.S. 
originated in Europe, with the most active investors from the U.K., Ger-
many, France, the Netherlands, and Switzerland. Recent numbers confirm 
Europe’s dominant role. The BEA reports that roughly two-thirds of the 
2006 outlays to acquire or establish U.S. businesses originated there.
The origin of FDI has implications for its destination in the United 
States. Shannon, Zeile, and Johnson (1999) show differences between the 
location choices made by foreign and U.S. investors, especially for green-
field establishments. Their research uses employment data for both for-
eign- and U.S.-owned establishments. Not surprisingly, the employment 
distribution of the two kinds of establishments across the U.S. is generally 
similar; the correlation coefficient is 0.95. In addition, both shares are 
highly correlated with the population distribution, although the correla-
12 The BEA defines a U.S. affiliate as a “U.S. business enterprise in which a single foreign 
person owns or controls, directly or indirectly, 10 percent or more of the voting securities if 
the enterprise is incorporated or an equivalent interest if the enterprise is unincorporated.”
13 The BEA defines the UBO as “the investor, proceeding up a U.S. affiliate’s ownership 















































tion for U.S.-owned establishments is higher (0.97 versus 0.92). However, 
foreign-owned establishments are more concentrated in the Southeastern 
United States. Four economic areas that rank in the top twenty for for-
eign-owned establishments rank significantly lower for U.S. establishments 
and population.14
There are more marked differences in the regional patterns of employ-
ment among the five major investing countries—Canada, France, Ger-
many, the U.K., and Japan. Canadian investment is concentrated in a num-
ber of areas along the country’s border and in the central United States. 
Greenfield investment primarily takes place in regions that already host 
Canadian-owned establishments. Investment projects from Canada are di-
versified, not concentrated in specific industries.
French- and German-owned greenfield establishments tend to be lo-
cated in the eastern half of the United States. Among new foreign-owned 
establishments, it is the British-owned that follow a regional pattern most 
similar to U.S. establishments. Thus it is strongly correlated with popula-
tion. Japanese greenfield establishments, on the other hand, show a pat-
tern distinct from other owner nations. They tend to be concentrated 
in the far Western United States and along a corridor from Indiana to 
northern Georgia. The Western establishments are in the electronics in-
dustry, whereas those in the corridor are mainly related to motor vehicle 
production.
Figure 10: Gross Product of U.S. Affiliates of Foreign multinationals
NOTE: Value-added replaces gross product for 2002–04.
SOURCE: Bureau of Economic Analysis, “Foreign Direct Investment in the U.S.: Financial and Operating Data for U.S. Afﬁliates
                of Foreign Multinational Companies,” gross product of afﬁliates, Table F.1.
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14 The four areas in the top twenty are Nashville, Greenville–Spartanburg–Anderson, 
Charlotte–Gastonia–Rock  Hill,  and  Raleigh–Durham–Chapel  Hill.  The  BEA  redefined 
172 economic areas in the U.S. in 1995. The areas are designed to be self-contained labor 
markets. This means all members of an area’s labor force have both their place of work and 














































Figure 11: Total Employment of U.S. Affiliates of Foreign multinationals
SOURCE: Bureau of Economic Analysis, “Foreign Direct Investment in the U.S.: Financial and Operating Data for U.S. Afﬁliates
                of Foreign Multinational Companies,” gross product of afﬁliates, Table G.1.
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Figure 12: Regional Breakdown of U.S. Affiliate Gross Product, 
1992–2004
SOURCE: Bureau of Economic Analysis, “Foreign Direct Investment in the U.S.: Financial and Operating Data for U.S. Afﬁliates 















Figure 13 compares U.S. regions’ total population shares with the 
shares  of  employment  by  foreign-owned  affiliates  of  various  countries. 
Aggregating across countries shows a distribution similar to that of the 
general population (comparing the second bar with the first). However, 
regional differences become obvious when looking at, for example, the 
disproportionate share of Latin American-owned establishments in the 
Southwest and the European concentration in New England and the Mid-
east.
7. ThE RETURNS ON FDI 
A puzzle that has received much attention recently is the apparent 














































eign investment in the U.S. While the U.S. current account deficit has 
been growing for decades, the investment income balance remained posi-
tive through 2006. Part of the explanation is that U.S. direct investment 
abroad generates a higher rate of return than FDI in the U.S. This is, in 
fact, the most commonly accepted explanation, and some of the reasons 
offered for this discrepancy are discussed in detail below.
Figure 13: Comparison of Regional Distribution of U.S. Population 
and Foreign-Owned-Establishment Employment, by Country of UBO
SOURCE: Bureau of Economic Analysis, “Foreign Direct Investment in the U.S.: Financial and Operating Data for U.S. Afﬁliates 



















However, Hausmann and Sturzenegger (2005) provide an alternative 
take on the facts. They put forward the hypothesis that the denominator 
underlying the rate of return calculation for U.S. assets abroad is consis-
tently mismeasured. The authors start with the assumption that an asset 
that consistently pays out more than another asset has to be worth more. 
This leads them to conclude that the U.S. must still be a net creditor to 
the world and that the BEA statistics are missing certain kinds of assets. 
Like its namesake in physics, this kind of “dark matter” cannot be mea-
sured directly, but its existence and size can be deduced by examining the 
data on returns. The amount of dark matter required to even out the rates 
of return is substantial: Instead of being a $2.5 trillion debtor to the world, 
the U.S. would have a surplus of around $600 billion.
According to Hausmann and Sturzenegger, the sources of this dark 
matter are in liquidity services the U.S. provides to the rest of the world, 
knowledge capital that is part of U.S. FDI overseas, and the fact that the 
U.S. can use Treasury debt to borrow at lower rates than it earns on its 
investments overseas. 
In the absence of dark matter, the difference in measured rates of 
return has to be addressed. Figure 14 shows the rates of return on invest-
ment by U.S. affiliates of foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies and U.S. 
affiliates of foreign companies.15 The gap between the two series is signifi-
15 The rates of return here are simply the ratios of direct investment receipts to direct 
investment at current cost and direct investment payments to foreign-owned direct investment 














































cant and persistent. The average annual return on foreign-owned direct 
investment in the U.S. over 1982–2006 was 3.1 percent. The equivalent 
number for U.S.-owned direct investment abroad was 9.6 percent. Figure 
15 shows that over the same period, the rates of return on portfolio invest-
ment were virtually identical, regardless whether it was U.S. assets held 
by foreigners or vice versa.
Figure 14: Rates of Return on FDI
SOURCE: Bureau of Economic Analysis, international investment position, Table 2, “International Investment Position of the 
                United States at Yearend, 1976–2006.” 
Percent
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Figure 15: Rates of Return on Portfolio Investment 
SOURCE: Bureau of Economic Analysis, international investment position, Table 2, “International Investment Position of the 
                United States at Yearend, 1976–2006.”  
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The rates of return are based on BEA definitions. The measure uses 
market value as opposed to purchase cost and excludes all changes in the 
market value of assets except for reinvested earnings. 
Three explanations have been advanced to explain the discrepancy 
(see, for example, Hung and Mascaro 2004): (1) A vintage effect, meaning 
U.S. investment projects abroad run more efficiently because the invest-














































higher because U.S. investors opt for more risky projects; and (3) a tax 
effect caused by foreign-controlled multinationals shifting profits out of 
the U.S. while U.S. subsidiaries, on the other hand, overstate their foreign 
profits. We next discuss each of these channels and present some recent 
alternative suggestions for the rate-of-return puzzle.
The vintage-effect argument is based on the fact that U.S. companies 
started directly investing in foreign markets about twenty years before 
foreign  companies  started  investing  significantly  in  the  United  States. 
Through the mid-1970s, stocks of foreign direct investment in the U.S. 
were  significantly  lower  than  stocks  of  U.S.  direct  investment  abroad. 
While some have attributed this difference to national security legislation 
restricting foreign direct investment in the U.S., a simpler explanation 
may be that the more rapid growth rates of the war-devastated European 
and Asian economies offered more attractive returns in the early postwar 
period. In the late 1970s and 1980s, foreign investment flows into the U.S. 
picked up. The vintage-effect hypothesis argues that these projects are 
still not as mature as U.S. projects overseas, and high initial costs and 
other start-up difficulties have kept the average rate of return low.
In a Survey of Current Business issue devoted to this subject, Mata-
loni (2000) also investigates the connection between the age of a multi-
national subsidiary and its rate of return.16 He finds that foreign-owned 
companies with a high ratio of new to total assets have a significantly 
larger return-on-assets (ROA) gap relative to their U.S. counterparts than 
foreign-owned companies with a low ratio, which implies that the firms 
with the high ratio have been in business for longer than two years.17
 In a panel analysis of firm-level data, Mataloni finds additional sup-
port for the relationship between age and ROA, especially for affiliates in 
the motor vehicles and equipment manufacturing sectors. (The average 
gap in the sector changed from –6.5 percent in 1988 to 3 percent in 1997 
as the affiliates matured.) 
A second possible explanation for the ROA gap, often discussed in 
the literature, is a difference in the risk structure of the projects U.S. and 
foreign investors undertake. According to this argument, U.S. investors 
need higher rates of return to compensate them for investing in countries 
with a lower country-risk rating. Hung and Mascaro (2004) show that the 
weighted-average Standard & Poor’s host-country rating for a representa-
tive U.S. FDI project is indeed only Bbb+, while every foreigner investing 
in the U.S. by definition enjoys a Aaa host-country rating. However, the 
average yield of U.S. corporate bonds with a Bbb+ rating has exceeded 
Aaa bond yields by only 0.8 percent over long periods. Thus, the authors 
conclude that differences in risk can at best account for only a small frac-
tion of the observed gap in ROA. 
16 Mataloni uses a slightly different measure for return on assets.
17 “New” assets are the assets of companies acquired or established by a given company 














































Finally, tax avoidance through transfer pricing has been a popular 
candidate for explaining the difference in returns. Differences in corporate 
tax rates may induce companies to over- or understate the profits gener-
ated by affiliates abroad. This can be easily achieved internally using 
transfer pricing, as discussed above. For example, a European multina-
tional facing a higher corporate tax rate on profits earned in the U.S. than 
on profits generated at home might charge its U.S. affiliate high prices 
for intermediate inputs. This would change the geographic breakdown of 
profits and reduce overall tax liabilities. 
The problem with this explanation is that testing it directly is ex-
tremely difficult. Mataloni (2000) tries to circumvent this problem by 
examining the relationship between the percentage of intrafirm-import 
content in total sales and the ROA gap. Firms with a high percentage of 
intrafirm-import content would have a bigger opportunity to shift prof-
its via transfer pricing; therefore, a positive correlation between that ra-
tio and the ROA gap could provide evidence of profit shifting. However, 
the relationship is rather weak. Another possible avenue is to investigate 
whether projects from countries with lower corporate tax rates than those 
in the U.S. show a larger ROA gap. But Mataloni cannot find a significant 
effect here, either. 
Tax considerations undeniably play a role, though. From 1999 to 2003, 
the rate of return on U.S.-owned direct investment in low-tax Ireland and 
Bermuda was three and two times higher, respectively, than the overall 
rate of return on U.S. FDI (Hung and Mascaro 2004). Studies report 
that intrafirm transfers of intangible assets increase in response to relative 
changes in tax regimes in the source and host country (Swenson 2001; 
Foley et al. 2006). Foley et al. also find evidence that on the firm level, the 
decision of whether to retain or distribute earnings is sensitive to changes 
in the tax system. This further supports the hypothesis that the negative 
outflow of capital for the U.S. in 2005 was mainly caused by the one-year 
tax holiday provided by the Jobs Creation Act of 2004. 
Gros (2006) takes the tax avoidance argument one step further. He 
bases his explanation on the observation that the reinvested earnings ac-
counting entry in the BEA statistics figures prominently in calculating 
the rates of return on U.S. investment projects abroad. FDI projects in 
the U.S., on the other hand, have consistently reported retained earnings 
close to zero.
From 1982 to 2004, the total reinvested earnings on U.S. direct invest-
ment abroad was more than $1.1 trillion dollars. The equivalent number 
for foreign investment in the U.S. was less than $20 billion. Gros (2006, 1) 
concludes that “it is difficult to accept this difference at face value, par-
ticularly since there is little difference in terms of distributed earnings be-
tween U.S. FDI abroad and foreign FDI in the U.S. and given that there is 
little difference in the reported returns on portfolio equity investment.” 
Reinvested earnings also constitute an accounting entry in the BEA’s 














































tween reported profits by the foreign affiliates of U.S. firms and the (mea-
sured) cross-border flows of dividends. The same applies to U.S. affiliates 
of foreign firms. However, the profit reported here is cross-checked with 
the profits declared for tax purposes. Therefore, there is a clear incentive 
to minimize the reported profit, given that the U.S. corporate tax rate is 
higher than most countries’. 
Gros points out that reinvested earnings’ sensitivity to fiscal and regu-
latory regimes became obvious in 2005, when reinvested earnings reported 
by U.S. firms dropped to near zero due to the aforementioned tax holi-
day. 
Gros also shows that excluding reinvested earnings when calculating 
the U.S. net income on direct investment abroad and current account defi-
cit has significant effects.18 The returns U.S. firms report on their foreign 
investment exceed the returns foreign firms report on their investment in 
the United States by 1 percent of U.S. GDP. Because this difference is 
caused solely by reinvested earnings, taking them out of the calculation 
increases the U.S. current account deficit by 1 percent of GDP (a differ-
ence of $130 billion in 2004). 
But taking out reinvested earnings also has consequences for the mea-
surement of flows. Gros shows that over half the reported gross income 
from U.S. direct investment consists of reinvested earnings. Excluding 
these earnings from the calculation reduces U.S. net income from FDI for 
1999–2004 from an average of $120 billion to $23 billion. It is noteworthy 
that net income is still positive even after this adjustment, given that the 
U.S. stock of FDI is smaller than the stock of foreign FDI in the United 
States. 
8. DOES U.S. FDI OvERSEAS COST U.S. JOBS?
The increase in overseas investment is often viewed as reducing do-
mestic activity, usually jobs. U.S. multinationals do move employment 
abroad to lower their costs by shifting production to low-wage affiliates. 
But whether the multinationals’ foreign operations are detrimental to do-
mestic employment comes down to the substitutability of their foreign 
workers for their U.S. employees. 
One way of estimating the relevant elasticity (employed by Slaughter 
1995, Brainard and Riker 1997, and Harrison and McMillan 2006) is to 
estimate a cost function for multinationals.19 This approach assumes that 
the output of each firm (or industry) is generated by one global produc-
tion function, which uses labor in different locations as distinct inputs. In 
addition, there is one aggregate capital stock. Within this framework, es-
timated coefficients are used to compute cross-price elasticities to answer 
the question of whether U.S. and overseas employment are substitutes or 
18 Gros argues that the asymmetry of reported reinvested earnings is sufficient reason to 
exclude it and use a more “traditional” measure of the U.S. balance of payments—namely, 
the sum of actual payment flows.















































complements. Slaughter estimates specifications for both fixed and adjust-
able capital. Brainard and Riker focus on the fixed-capital case, arguing 
that this assumption is unproblematic because we are interested in labor 
substitution at the margin, taking plant capacity as given. Harrison and 
McMillan criticize this approach, noting that capital, along with other 
inputs and technology, is assumed to be predetermined this way.
To address U.S. multinationals’ effect on domestic employment, we 
start by conducting an extended robustness check of Slaughter’s results. 
We use publicly available BEA data on operations of U.S. multinationals 
abroad. The data cover 1983 to 2004, and we investigate a panel of 34 
industries, all of them in manufacturing. Capital is treated as a variable 
input, since the assumption of fixed plant capacity over this period seems 
unrealistic. 
The approach involves estimating a system of N–1 cost-share equa-
tions, where N is the number of production factors. For example, to rep-
licate Slaughter’s results, we aggregate over all affiliates to compute the 
price elasticity of substitution between domestic and overseas employment 
for U.S. multinationals. There are three production factors (labor at home, 
labor abroad, and capital), so we estimate two equations of the form
(1)     Siat = β0i + ∑j βijlnP jat + βiY Y at .
Siat is the cost share of factor i in industry a at time t, and Pjat the 
price of factor j in industry a at time t. Y at is output in industry a at time t, 
which we use as a proxy for total sales. The price of labor is calculated by 
dividing total compensation by the number of employees. The cost share 
is the ratio of the costs related to one specific factor to total cost. For ex-
ample, in the specification without capital, the cost share for domestically 
employed labor is the share of compensation going to domestic workers. 
When capital is included in the specification, its factor price is proxied by 
Moody’s series for Aaa bond rates. Capital itself is taken from the series 
on total assets. 
To simplify the expression, we omit the fixed effects, controlling for 
industry-specific and period-specific effects. A full set of these effects is 
included in the estimation, however. 
Homotheticity of the production function results in invariance of the 
factor shares to overall scale of production, or more formally, βiY = 0 ∀i. 
However, we control for scale effects in our specification. Table 1 compares 
our results with Slaughter’s.20 We report both the estimated coefficients 
of interest and the cross- and own-price elasticities of factor demand that 
are our primary interest. Note that an exact match with Slaughter is im-
possible given that he uses data from 1977 and 1982–89 and our data set 
starts at 1983. With the exception of the own-price elasticities, the match 
is reasonably close. We find employment abroad and employment at home 
to be (weakly) complementary, just as Slaughter does in his specification 
with variable capital.














































Table 1: Estimates of the Elasticity of Substitution Between Domestic 










βpa –.098 –.086 –.078
Standard error   .026   .015 .009
ηpa –.040 –.035          –.004
ηap –.189           –.18          –.017
ηaa –.371           –.84          –.987
ηpp –.256           –.5          –.47
No. of observations 282 226           678
NOTES: See Table 13, specification 6 in Slaughter (1995). Each specification contains a 
full set of industry dummies and time dummies and is estimated using seemingly unrelated 
regression. The subscripts a and p designate affiliate and parent, respectively. Slaughter’s 
sample  includes  1977  and  1982–89.  βpa  is  the  estimated  coefficient  on  the  affiliate 
compensation rate in the parent cost-share equation. ηpa is the implied price elasticity of 
demand for parent labor with respect to affiliate compensation costs. ηaa is the implied 
own-price elasticity of demand for affiliate labor. The relationship between the estimated 
coefficients and the relevant elasticities is given by  β Sp + pa Sa
Sp
= ηpa ; the own-price elasticity 




We next repeat the calculation for the whole sample, 1983–2004, to 
check whether the rapid increases in FDI activity over those years change 
the validity of Slaughter’s findings for the 1980s. Column 3 of Table 1 
shows the results. At this level of aggregation, there seems to be no strong 
relationship between affiliate compensation costs and U.S. employment by 
multinationals. The complementary relationship has disappeared; confi-
dence-interval computations show that our estimate for the price elasticity 
of demand for domestic labor with respect to affiliate compensation costs 
is not significantly different from zero.
Thus far, we have only considered employment either in the U.S. 
or abroad, thereby aggregating over all foreign countries. However, the 
studies by Brainard and Riker (1997) and Harrison and McMillan (2006) 
suggest aggregating affiliates along income lines. So we differentiate be-
tween affiliates in developed countries (Europe, Canada, and Japan) and 
developing countries. Table 2 shows the results. Our estimation suggests 
that affiliate employment in developed countries is complementary to par-
ent employment in the U.S. The confidence interval corresponding to the 
estimate is solidly on one side of zero. On the other hand, the price elastic-
ity of demand for parent labor with respect to developing-country affiliate 
compensation costs is close to zero. In addition, we do not find evidence of 
substitution (or complementarity) between affiliate employment in devel-














































Table 2: Alternative Estimates of the Elasticity of Substitution Between 
Domestic and Foreign Affiliate Employment in U.S. multinationals
βpm βpl βml ηpm ηpl ηpp ηmm ηll Observations
Coefficient –.103 –.016 –.003 — — — — — 503
Standard
error
.010  .004  .003 — — — — — —
Implied
elasticity




— — — ±.034 ±.009 — — — —
NOTES: The specification contains a full set of industry dummies and time dummies and is 
estimated using seemingly unrelated regression. The subscripts p, m, and l designate parent, 
affiliates in more developed countries, and affiliates in less developed countries, respectively. 
Confidence intervals are computed using the procedure Anderson and Thursby (1986) out-
line. For interpretation of β and η, see Table 1 notes.
This finding supports the view that U.S. companies’ increase in multi-
national activity has not robbed the domestic economy of jobs. Once one 
splits the sample into FDI going to developed countries and FDI going to 
poorer countries, two facts that have not received much attention emerge. 
An increase in multinational activity in developed nations is likely to 
generate more—not less—employment in the U.S. And the rise in FDI in 
poorer countries is far from being a zero-sum game in which increases in 
employment abroad imply unemployment at home.
Of course, before too much is read into these results, the limitations of 
the BEA industry-level data used in these estimations must be taken into 
account. In addition to providing less detail than confidential, firm-level 
data, these numbers suffer from missing observations whenever cells are 
not reported due to confidentiality concerns. However, the number of ob-
servations and the statistical significance of our coefficient estimate (and 
the subsequently narrow confidence band around the elasticity estimate) 
are reassuring. In addition, all the own-price elasticities are negative and 
in a highly plausible range. The value of –0.295 for the U.S. is very close 
to what Hamermesh (1993) calls his “best guess” of –0.3. 
9. CONCLUSIONS
This article documents some key facts about foreign direct investment 
by U.S. firms in recent years. Direct investment by U.S. corporations 
overseas is growing in importance and is yet another channel through 
which the U.S. economy is becoming more integrated with the rest of the 
world.
Contrary to what might be expected, the bulk of U.S. direct invest-
ment overseas remains concentrated in other developed countries, suggest-
ing that these investment flows are driven by considerations other than a 
desire to access cheap foreign labor. Indeed, we present evidence that sug-
gests employment at foreign affiliates of U.S. multinationals complements 














































U.S. multinationals overseas tends to be accompanied by increased, rather 
than decreased, employment by these firms in the United States. 
Direct investment flows are a two-way street. While U.S. firms have 
been expanding their operations overseas, foreign companies have become 
important investors in the United States and currently employ about 5.5 
million workers domestically. A remaining puzzle is why the measured re-
turn on U.S. foreign direct investment overseas is persistently higher than 
the measured return on foreign direct investment in the United States. 
A number of explanations have been offered, but none seem to provide a 
complete answer.
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